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Abstract
Using annual data for 18 OECD countries over the period 1980-2004, we investigate how
labour and ﬁnancial factors interact to determine unemployment by estimating a dynamic
panel model using the system generalized method of moments (GMM). We show that the
impact of ﬁnancial variables depends strongly on the labour market context. Increased
market capitalization as well as decreased banking concentration reduce unemployment if
the level of labour market regulation, union density and coordination in wage bargaining
is low. The above ﬁnancial variables have no eﬀect otherwise. Increasing intermediated
credit and banking concentration is beneﬁcial for employment when the degree of labour
market regulation, union density and coordination in wage bargaining is high. These results
suggest that the respective virtues of ed and market-based ﬁnance are crucially tied to the
labour market context.
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11 Introduction
For a long time, the diversity of unemployment rates among countries has fuelled the debate
concerning the role of labour market institutions. A rich literature has developed, depicting
strong labour legislation, unemployment protection, wage taxation and union action as sources
of rigidity. In general, they are thought to lead to a low equilibrium rate of employment (Nickell
(1997), Siebert (1997) and Layard & Nickell (1999))1.
This literature has recently been reinforced by studies on the interactions between institu-
tional arrangements within labour markets. For instance, Nickell, Nunziata, Ochel & Quintini
(2002) show that the harmful e®ect of the gross replacement rate on unemployment is ampli¯ed
when the duration of unemployment bene¯t is long. Similarly, Nickell, Nunziata & Ochel (2005)
argue that the tax wedge increases unemployment all the more when the degree of coordination
in wage bargaining is high. In a similar vein, the literature on institutional complementarities
and substitutability has devoted special attention to the interactions between labour market
institutions (notably employment protection legislation or union density) and product market
regulations2.
Labour and product market institutions are not the only factors determining unemployment.
The empirical literature on 'growth and ¯nance' shows that investment and growth are strongly
related to ¯nancial development3. It is also well known that the size of ¯nancial markets, the role
of ¯nancial intermediation, the degree of banking concentration etc. di®er dramatically among
countries (Allen & Gale (1995, 2000)). This has given rise to an abundant literature on the
opposition between bank-based and marked-based ¯nancial systems. This literature investigates
the respective virtues of banks and ¯nancial markets in terms of a reduction of information
asymmetry and corporate ¯nancing. While banks allow to ¯nance small and risky businesses
as well as ¯rms with lesser reputation and intangible assets, arm's length ¯nancing (through
¯nancial markets or multiple banking relationships) is more suitable for large and creditworthy
¯rms, with solid reputation and tangible assets (Berlin & Loeys (1988), Diamond (1991), Berlin
& Mester (1992) and Rajan (1992)).
These issues are all the more interesting considering recent developments within the politi-
cal economy literature, which stress the interdependence between labour and ¯nancial market
devices. According to Pagano & Volpin (2005), ¯nance and labour contribute jointly to design
the opposition between the so-called corporatist and non-corporatist economies. Contrary to the
latter, corporatist economies are characterized by a proportional (rather than majority) voting
system, weak shareholder protection as well as strong employment protection. In a similar vein,
some contributions suggest that the emergence of bank-based ¯nance and tight labour regulation
1For a survey of the literature on the links between labour market institutions and employment performances,
see Arpai & Mourre (2005).
2The theoretical aspects of this literature are explored by Blanchard & Giavazzi (2003), Hebell & Haefke
(2003), Amable & Gatti (2004) and Amable & Gatti (2006). Empirical analysis have been advanced by Nicoletti
& Scarpetta (2005), Gri±th, Harrison & Macartney (2006), Berger & Danninger (2007), Amable, Demmou &
Gatti (2010), Fiori, Nicoletti, Scarpetta & Schiantarelli (2007) and Kugler & Pica (2008).
3See, among others, Levine & Zervos (1998), Beck & Levine (2002), Beck, Levine & Loayza (2002), Carlin &
Mayer (2003) and Djankov (2008).
2are both associated with civil law rather than with common-law (Egrungor (2004), Botero et al.
(2005)) as well as with concentrated ¯nancial wealth (Perroti & Von Thadden (2006)). Taken
together, these arguments suggest that a correlation might exist between tight institutions on
labour and ¯nancial markets.
The theoretical literature has recently emphasized the idea that the interactions between
labour and ¯nancial market institutions may have important consequences for aggregate employ-
ment. In fact, ¯nancial market imperfections create a bias in decisions concerning the creation
of ¯rms, job vacancies etc. According to ths literature, the sign and extent of the bias would
depend on the structure of the labour market (Rendon (2001), Belke & Fehn (2002), Koskela
& Stenbacka (2002) and Wasmer & Weil (2004)). Nevertheless empirical studies addressing the
issue are infrequent. A few empirical papers focus on the determinants of labour demand and
provide evidence on the role of ¯nancial factors based on micro-data (Nickell & Wadhwani (1991),
Sharpe (1994), Nickell & Nicolitsas (1999), Belke & Fehn (2002), Belke, Fehn & Foster (2004),
Caggese & Cunat (2008) and Benito & Hernando (2008)). However, empirical contributions
adressing the macroeconomic e®ects of interactions between institutions on labour and ¯nancial
markets and focusing on aggregate employment are missing. The goal of this paper is therefore
to ¯ll this gap.
We make here use of an annual data set for 18 OECD countries over the period 1980-2004
to investigate how labour and ¯nancial market features jointly a®ect the unemployment rate,
and implement recently developed dynamic panel data methods. Speci¯cally, we carry out the
system Generalized Moment Method (GMM) estimator developed by Arellano & Bover (1995),
Blundel & Bond (1998) to estimates a dynamic model that includes country ¯xed e®ects and
interaction terms in order to capture the interdependence across several institutional devices on
labour and ¯nancial markets. Our primary goal here is to check whether ¯nancial factors matter
in determining unemployment. Second, we aim to understand whether the e®ects of ¯nancial
arrangements depend on the labour market context, as the theoretical literature suggests. Fi-
nally, we investigate whether the empirical evidence on employment can be interpreted in the
light of the distinction frequently made between market-based and bank-based ¯nance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the theoretical and empirical background
for our research. Data, econometric methodology and results are presented in Section 3. In order
to ensure that our results are robust to modi¯cations in our estimated model, we consider several
¯nancial market indicators and alternative labour market characteristics. Section 4 provides
additional robustness checks and discusses the policy consequences of our analysis. Section 5
o®ers some concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical and empirical background
The rationale for our analysis lies at the intersection of two streams of the literature. The
¯rst one deals with the ¯nancial determinants of labour demand. The second one refers to the
interactions between ¯nancial and labour market institutions.
32.1 Financial determinants of labour demand
According to the new-Keynesian view, market imperfections (such as adjustment costs and
information asymmetries) play a crucial role in business °uctuations. This explains why ¯rms'
labour demand depends on ¯nancial factors. Greenwald & Stiglitz (1993) and Arnold (2002)
show that ¯nancial constraints induced by information asymmetries make ¯rms' labour demand
dependent on their balance-sheet position. As a consequence, employment °uctuates according
to the ¯nancial pressures that ¯rms face.
Relatively few empirical studies have been devoted to the ¯nancial determinants of labour
demand4. Existing papers are mainly based on ¯rm-level econometric investigations. Sharpe
(1994) ¯nd that the sensitivity of American ¯rms' labour demand to sales increases with their
leverage ratio. Using a set of British ¯rms, Nickell & Wadhwani (1991) show that employment
decreases with ¯rms' leverage ratio and increases with their market capitalization. Nickell &
Nicolitsas (1999) establish that employment falls with the ratio of interest payment to cash-
°ow. Benito & Hernando (2008) obtain the same outcome for Spanish ¯rms. Caggese & Cunat
(2008) establish that ¯nancial constraints a®ect ¯rms' employment policy and the mix between
permanent and temporary employment.
Other studies examine how ¯nancial factors a®ect employment through their impact on
¯rms' creation. According to Acemoglu (2001), ¯nancial constraint harms employment because
it hinders the emergence of new innovating ¯rms, which create jobs. He observes that, since the
60's, the employment rates of ¯rms dependent on external ¯nance has been higher in Europe than
in the United States, arguing that this is due to the stronger regulation of European ¯nancial
systems. Finally, Belke & Fehn (2002), Fechs & Fuchs (2003) and Belke & al. (2004) focus
on venture capital. Resorting to theoretical formalizations and empirical investigations using
macroeconomic data, they show that an insu±cient development of venture capital prevents the
emergence of new ¯rms, thus penalizing employment.
2.2 Interactions between ¯nancial and labour markets regulation
An important theoretical debate within the economic literature concerns the sign and e®ects
of interactions between ¯nancial arrangements and labour market institutions.
A ¯rst stream of literature focuses on the common determinants of ¯nancial arrangements
and labour market institutions. On the one hand, Egrungor (2004) suggests that the opposition
between bank-based and market-based ¯nance is linked to a country's legal origins. Whereas
banks act as e®ective contract enforcers in response to the rigidity of civil law-based economies,
¯nancial markets emerge in common law-based countries, where rules are enforced by legal in-
stitutions. On the other hand, Botero et al. (2005) and Pagano & Volpin (2005) argue that
the regulation of labour is generally more stringent in countries with proportional electoral sys-
tems; these systems are also associated with weak shareholders protection and ¯nancial markets
4The ¯nancial determinants of capital demand and the sensitivity of investment to cash-°ow have received
much more attention. On this issue, see the seminal papers by Fazzari, Hubbard & Petersen (1988), Gertler &
Gilchrist (1994) and Bond & Meghir (1994).
4development. Taken together, these arguments establish an objective link between ¯nance and
labour market institutions. Countries who have inherited civil law legal systems should associate
bank dominance with tight labour market regulation while common law countries should exhibit
highly developed ¯nancial markets and °exible labour market regulation. Using a theoretical
model where ¯nancial structure and labour market regulation are determined by the distribution
of ¯nancial wealth, Perroti & Von Thadden (2006) reach the same conclusion. They show that
economies exhibiting di®used ¯nancial wealth are characterized by highly developed ¯nancial
markets and weak worker protection while economies with concentrated ¯nancial wealth should
feature bank-based ¯nancial systems and strong labour regulation.
Another series of contributions investigates the implications of the interactions between ¯-
nancial arrangements and labour market institutions on unemployment. In a ¯rst set of papers,
¯nancial deregulation and labour market °exibilization are regarded as substitutes. In Rendon
(2001), the removal of ¯ring and hiring costs favours employment. Financial development also
promotes job creation since it allows ¯rms to ¯nance labour adjustment costs by security is-
suance. As their hiring policy becomes less dependent on their internal resources, ¯rms adjust
their employment level more rapidly. Therefore, if ¯nancial development is high, the removal of
labour market adjustment costs loses its e®ectiveness since costs can be ¯nanced by the issuance
of securities. Symmetrically, if the labour market is made perfectly °exible, the access to external
¯nance has less of an impact on employment. In Belke & Fehn (2002), a strong labour protec-
tion allows workers to partly capture the rent stemming from the entrepreneur's project. This
decreases the project's rate of return below the minimum threshold de¯ned by funders. Hence,
the ¯rm can not emerge and no labour is hired, thus generating unemployment. However, the
rise in unemployment yields a decline in labour protection and a subsequent rise in the project's
return above the founders' threshold. Nevertheless, if the ¯rm is ¯nancially constrained, the
adjustment is slower and the return to higher employment is delayed. When the labour market
is °exible, there is no unemployment and ¯nancial deregulation becomes useless. When the
¯nancial system is frictionless, the return to employment is immediate and the deregulation of
labour market loses interest.
In a second set of papers, ¯nancial deregulation and labour market °exibility are seen as
complementary. Wasmer & Weil (2004) provide a thoeretical model where the liberalization of
labour and/or ¯nancial markets improves markets liquidity and reduces agents' matching costs:
¯rms and workers match more easily on the labour market, as well as ¯rms and banks on the
credit market. This yields positive e®ects on employment. Koskela & Stenbacka (2002) model
the e®ects of a reduction of bank competition in an economy where workers are remunerated by
a bargained base wage and a share of ¯rms' pro¯t. Because the ¯rms' hiring policy is ¯nanced by
borrowing, an increase in the interest rate implied by a reduction of banking competition hinders
employment. But workers internalize the rise in hiring costs and bargain less harshly concerning
their base wage. The moderating e®ect dominates when unions are powerful. Otherwise, the
former e®ect prevails. Hence, the introduction of imperfections in the banking sector curbs
the negative impact of labour market frictions. In other words, ¯nancial deregulation favours
employment only if the labour market is very °exible. Deregulation becomes counter-productive
if the labour market is highly regulated. Labour and ¯nancial market institutions are also seen as
5complementary in the literature on human capital investment. Acemoglu & Pischke (1999) show
that tight labour market institutions and credit rationing favour ﬁrms’ investment in human
capital yielding improvements in labour productivity. This result suggests that deregulation
on both labour and ﬁnancial markets may trigger productivity losses and adverse eﬀects on
employment. Unfortunately, this aspect is not formally addressed in existing theoretical models.
3 Econometric investigation
The theoretical literature reviewed in the previous section suggests that ﬁnancial factors
matter in determining unemployment. Moreover, the eﬀects of ﬁnancial arrangements may
depend on the structure of the labour market. In this respect, the distinction between market-
based and bank-based ﬁnance appears crucial.
In this section, we turn to the econometric analysis and outline in the ﬁrst two sub-sections
the details of the empirical model considered, as well as the data used, and the econometric
methodology. Main econometric results are discussed in the last sub-section and tables of results
a r ep r o v i d e di nA p p e n d i x3a n d4 .
3.1 Data and econometric model
Our panel includes annual data for 18 OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States) and covers the period 1980-2004. We con-
sider a time-series cross-sectional model that includes country ﬁxed eﬀects as well as a few inter-
action terms allowing us to investigate the interdependence across several institutional devices.
The general speciﬁcation of our empirical model is as follows:
Ui,t = αi+υt+β·Ui,t−1+χ·LABOURi,t+δ·FIN i,t+γ·LABOURi,t·FIN i,t+φ·CVi,t+ i,t (1)
,w h e r eαi is the country i ﬁxed eﬀect, υt t h et i m es p e c i ﬁce ﬀect, Ui,t the standardized rate of
unemployment obtained from the OECD, Ui,t−1 the lagged rate of unemployment, capturing
the inertia in the unemployment dynamics, and  i,t the disturbance term assumed to follow the
standard assumptions.
The model features a number of regressors capturing the institutional and macroeconomic
characteristics of the investigated economies. Recent studies have underlined problems related to
the inclusion of time-invariant variables within ﬁxed-eﬀect models (Amable, Demmou & Gatti
(2010)). To avoid those problems, we pay particular attention to the institutional variables
included in our regressions. Time-series institutional variables (instead of time-invariant indic-
ators) are preferred whenever they are available.
LABOURi,t is a set of 3 variables accounting for labour market institutions. LMREGi,t is
the measure of employment protection legislation built by Amable, Demmou & Gatti (2010)5.
5This time-series indicator is based on EPL (Employment Protection Legislation) scores provided by Nickell,
6Contrary to the standard OECD indicator, LMREGi;t is a time-series variable between 0 (for
the lowest level of employment protection) to 3 (for the highest level of protection). COORDi;t
evaluates the degree of coordination in wage bargaining. Taken from Nickell, Nunziata & Ochel
(2005), this variable ranges from 0 to 3 with higher scores corresponding to higher coordination.
UNIONi;t is the degree of union density, calculated by the OECD as the proportion of union
members among workers.
FINi;t denotes a set of three ¯nancial indicators. Currently used in the ¯nance and growth
literature, they come from the DemircÄ u» c-Kunt & Levine (2001) data set. CAPIi;t is a ratio of
stock market capitalisation to GDP. CREDITi;t is a ratio of the claims to the private sector by
¯nancial intermediaries (deposit money banks, insurance companies, private pensions, pooled
investment schemes and development banks) to GDP. Both variables capture the e®ect of ¯nan-
cial constraint on unemployment, as described in Rendon (2001), Acemoglu (2001) and Belke
& Fehn (2002)6. However, the two variables can be included in the regressions simultaneously
since, as explained above, intermediated and arm's length ¯nance constitute alternative funding
channels. CONCi;t, which is the ratio of the three largest banks' asset to total banking sector
assets, evaluates the concentration of the banking sector. In the theoretical literature on ¯nan-
cial intermediation, high banking concentration is closely associated with intermediated ¯nance
since high interest rates increase banks' incentive to produce private information on borrowers.
Conversely, when concentration in the banking sector is low, banks behave more as arms' length
lenders. This measure, suggested by Koskela & Stenbacka (2002), is only available over the pe-
riod 1980-2004. Therefore, when CONCi;t is included in the model, the number of observations
is reduced.
CVi;t is a set of seven control variables, all provided by the OECD. In reference to the literature
on the institutional determinants of unemployment, we include WEDGEi;t and REPLACEi;t
(the tax wedge and the replacement rate for unemployment bene¯t respectively) as well as
PMREGi;t, an indicator of regulatory reform on product markets. PMREGi;t is based on the
REGREFF indicator from the OECD database and summarizes regulatory provisions in seven
non-manufacturing sectors: telecom, electricity, gas, post, rail, air passenger transport, and road
freight. The indicator, which has been estimated by OECD over the period 1975 to 2003, ranges
from 0 (for the lowest level of regulation) to 6 (for the highest level of regulation). The fourth
control variable, EXCHANGEi;t, is the real exchange rate. It accounts for the competitiveness
of national products. The ¯fth control variable is, RATE, the short-term interest rate. The
sixth, GDPi;t, stands for the GDP per employee. Finally, the last control variable is CY CLEi;t,
the ratio of the °ow of credit in the economy to GDP, which accounts for the impact of the
Nunziata & Ochel (2005) as well as on measures of structural reforms obtained from the FRDB Database. We use
the following variables from FRDB database: the number of reforms passed each year in each country, whether
they are directed towards more °exibility (by decreasing restrictions in domains such as wage setting, ¯ring
restriction, working time regulation etc.) as well as whether they apply to all, or a large majority of professional
categories, contract typologies etc.
6Following the empirical studies by Belke & Fehn (2002), Belke & al. (2004) and Fechs & Fuchs (2003), we
could have also considered the level of venture capital ¯nancing. But many venture capital data are missing for
the period and the countries covered by our panel.
7credit cycle7.
The list of dependent and independent variables described above is reported in Table 1.1 in
Appendix 1. Table 1.2, also included in Appendix 1, provides summary statistics for each of
them.
3.2 Econometric Methodology
The most common panel data econometric techniques for estimating an equation like (1)
are OLS, Between, Within, or MCG. However, it should be emphasised that the estimates of the
coe±cients of equation (1) obtained with such techniques can be biased for a variety of reasons,
among them measurement error, reverse causation and omitted variable bias. Therefore, a
suitable estimation method should be used in order to obtain unbiased, consistent and e±cient
estimates of these coe±cients. To deal with these biases, researchers have utilised dynamic
panel regressions with lagged values of the explanatory endogenous variables as instruments.
Such methods have several advantages over cross-sectional instrumental variable regressions. In
particular, they control for endogeneity and measurement error not only of the lag standardized
rate of unemployment variable, but also of other explanatory variables. Note also that, in the
case of cross-section regressions, the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term
if it is not instrumented.
In our analysis, we employ the system GMM estimator developed by Arellano & Bover (1995),
which combines a regression in di®erences with one in levels (see Appendix 2 for further details).
Blundel & Bond (1998) present Monte Carlo evidence that the inclusion of the level regression
in the estimation reduces the potential bias in ¯nite samples and the asymptotic inaccuracy
associated with the di®erence estimator. The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the
validity of the instruments used in the model as well as the assumption that the error term does
not exhibit serial correlation. In our case, the instruments are chosen from the lagged endogenous
and explanatory variables. In order to test the validity of the selected instruments, we perform
the Hansen-Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions proposed by Arellano & Bond (1991). In
addition, we also check for the presence of any residual autocorrelation. Finally, we perform
stationarity and unit-root tests belonging to the ¯rst-(Hadri (2000), Im, Pesaran & Shin (2003))
and second-generation stationarity and unit root test (Harry, Leybourne & MacCabe (2005),
Pesaran (2007)). The results suggest that all series are stationary (see Tables 3.1 to 3.10 in
Appendix 3), and consequently no co-integration analysis is necessary8.Therefore we proceed
7CREDITi;t is a stock variable that accounts for the structural aspects of the ¯nancial system whereas
CY CLEi;t is a °ow variable that captures conjonctural e®ects.
8A common feature of the panel unit root tests by Im & al. (2003) and Pesaran (2007) is that they maintained
the null hypothesis of a unit root in all panel members. Therefore, rejecting their null does not provide compelling
evidence about stationarity of all panel members (as it is sometimes assumed), but only indicates that at least
one panel member is stationary, with no information about how many series or which ones are stationary. This
possibility for a mixed panel implies that some of the members may be stationary while others may be non-
stationary (see e.g Taylor & Sarno (1998) and Taylor & Taylor (2004) for further details in the context of
the PPP debate). On the contrary, the panel stationarity tests by Hadri (2000) and Harry & al. (2005) test
joint stationarity of the individual series under the null. And consequently, a failure to reject their null can be
8directly to the GMM estimation.
It is worth noting that Equation (1) includes several interaction terms allowing us to capture
the interdependence between ¯nancial and labour market devices. Therefore after estimating
this equation, we examine whether the consequences of ¯nancial market arrangements depend
on the regulatory environment on the labour market, and vice versa. STATA also allows to
evaluate the e®ects of each relevant variable for di®erent levels of the interacted variables. This
amounts to calculating the marginal e®ects of each variable, as well as all statistics concerning
the signi¯cance of those marginal e®ects. In the presence of interaction terms, the overall impact
of LABOUR and FIN indicators on unemployment equals the marginal e®ect conditional on
speci¯c values of the interacted variables. From model (1), one has:
@U
@LABOUR
= Â + ° ¢ ] FIN (2)
@U
@FIN
= ± + ° ¢ ^ LABOUR
,where ] FIN and ^ LABOUR correspond to speci¯c levels of labour and ¯nancial indicators that
have been selected to give a clear picture of the importance and evolution of marginal coe±cients.
The speci¯c levels that we have retained are minimum value, mean value minus one standard
error, mean, mean plus one standard error and maximum value.
3.3 Estimation results
As we have seen, the theoretical literature on unemployment determinants generally focuses
on the degree of rigidity of labour market institutions in relation to ¯nancial characteristics.
Hence, in the ¯rst place we restrict our attention to labour market variables capturing the
rigidity of labour regulation, that is UNION and LMREG9. To ensure that our results are
robust, we consider several variants of our empirical model. We proceed as follows: leaving the
speci¯cation with the two labour regulation variables (UNION and LMREG) and the seven
control variables unchanged, we consider our ¯nancial variables one by one. We subsequently
estimate an encompassing model including all labour and ¯nancial indicators. Doing this, we pay
particular attention to the interaction terms included in our regressions. Considering interactions
with one labour market variable at a time allows us to check for the robustness of the estimated
coe±cients across alternative speci¯cations. We are thus able to make sure that the signs of
those coe±cients are not too sensitive to changes in the interacted variables.
Before turning to regressions, we test for the pooling restrictions implicit in equation (1) and
investigate whether key parameters of this equation are equal across countries, implying that
interpreted unambiguously as evidence for stationnaity holding in the entire panel. The results of these last two
tests are available upon request and con¯rm that all series are stationary. We think that a combination of these
stationarity and unit-root tests might reassure the reader in the sense that they provide strong support that these
series are stationary and the research can proceed to the GMM estimation.
9However, in the next section we will add one additional labour market dimension by taking the impact of
wage coordination into account.
9pooling time series and cross-sectional data is appropriate in our context. Speci¯cally, we employ
a multi-step procedure to test pooling restrictions in our system of 18 OECD members where
hypotheses of interest are tested by means of a likelihood-ratio (L-R) statistic. This procedure
is in the same spirit than the approach proposed by Hsiao (1986). Our results (available upon
resquest) indicate that common coe±cients can be assumed across countries and therefore pool-
ing time series and cross sectional data appears to be convenient here. Besides the ¯xed e®ect
speci¯cation turns out to be the more adequate in our framework.
The econometric results of the dynamic panel regressions of equation (1) by the system GMM
estimator are reported in Table 4.1 (see Appendix 4) whereas Table 4.2 shows the marginal
coe±cients of LABOUR and FIN indicators for given levels of the interacted variables. In
Table 4.1 (columns [1]-[2]), we present results for a speci¯cation including CAPI (ratio of stock
market development to GDP) as a unique ¯nancial indicator. In columns [3]-[4] we consider
CREDIT (ratio of the claims to the private sector by ¯nancial intermediaries to GDP), while
in columns [5]-[6] we investigate the e®ects of CONC (concentration of the banking sector).
For each of the above speci¯cations, we interact our selected ¯nancial indicator with one labour
market variable at a time (LMREG or UNION). Finally, columns [7]-[8] present the regression
results based on the encompassing model featuring all ¯nancial indicators together. Once again,
we interact those indicators with LMREG (column [7]) or UNION (column [8]) alternatively.
We comment on our results on labour market and control variables below. We then analyse the
econometric evidence concerning the ¯nancial factors.
Table 4.2 reports marginal coe±cients estimated by STATA on the basis of regression results
presented in Table 4.1. Column [1] in Part A of Table 4.2 provides marginal coe±cients for
the CAPI indicator corresponding to ¯ve di®erent levels of the interacted labour variable (i.e.
LMREG) as speci¯ed in column [1] of Table 4.1. Symmetrically, column [1] in Part B of Table
4.2 reports the marginal coe±cients of the LMREG variable for given levels of the interacted
¯nancial indicator (i.e. CAPI). We apply the same procedure to all other columns of Table
4.2. However, one should note that no marginal coe±cient can be calculated for labour market
variables (speci¯cations [7]-[8] in Part B of Table 4.2). The reason is that those variants of
the model include three interactions terms for each labour indicator. Hence, we cannot isolate
pertinent reference values of interacted variables enabling us to calculate marginal coe±cients
properly. Nevertheless, we can calculate the marginal coe±cients for the ¯nancial variables.
These coe±cients are presented in columns [7]-[8], Part A of Table 4.2. Before commenting
on these results, it is worth noting that our GMM model speci¯cations pass all the standard
diagnostic tests, whose P-values are given in the three last lines of Table 4.1. In particular, there
is no evidence of residual autocorrelation or order two, and the validity of the instruments is
always con¯rmed by Hansen-Sargan's test.
To start with, one should note that the coe±cient of the lagged rate of unemployment is
highly signi¯cant and positive in all regressions, highlighting a strong inertia in the evolution of
employment performances. The coe±cients for control variables are not systematically signi¯cant
across all speci¯cations. However, when they appear signi¯cant, they have the expected sign. The
coe±cients of EXCHANGE (columns [1]-[2]-[4] and [8]) and CY CLE (in all columns except
[3]-[7]) are negative. Hence, as expected, we ¯nd that increased competitiveness and credit
10°ow generally imply lower unemployment. Moreover, as expected, we ¯nd that an increase
in the tax wedge raises unemployment (variants [3]-[6] and [7]). The same result holds for
stronger product market regulation (speci¯cations [4]-[5]-[6]) and for higher short-term interest
rate (variant [4]). The coe±cient for GDP is never signi¯cant (except in speci¯cation [4], in
which it is negative). This suggests that the expected positive impact of high productivity
on labour demand and employment is balanced by the exclusion of low skilled workers from
the labour market. Finally, as in other empirical contributions (Nickell (1997), Fiori, Nicoletti,
Scarpetta & Schiantarelli (2007), Baccaro & Rei (2007) and Amable & al. (2010)), the coe±cient
on the replacement rate is generally insigni¯cant.
Turning to the impact of labour market variables, our results indicate that changing labour
markets' structure has contrasted e®ects on unemployment. On the one hand, we ¯nd that union
density has no e®ect on unemployment. On the other hand, with the exception of speci¯cations
[1]-[2], we ¯nd an insigni¯cant coe±cient for labour market regulation. This result is in line
with Nickell (1997), Layard & Nickell (1999), Belot & Ours (2001), Nickell, Nunziata & Ochel
(2005), Fiori, Nicoletti, Scarpetta & Schiantarelli (2007), Baccaro & Rei (2007) and Amable &
al. (2010). However, when the coe±cient of LMREG appears signi¯cant (in columns [1]-[2]),
it is negative, which means that increased job protection contributes to lower unemployment.
Moreover, marginal coe±cients given in Part B of Table 4.2 (column [1]) are signi¯cant and
negative for values of CAPI below (or equal to) the mean level. This result is in line with
Acemoglu & Pischke (1999)'s view that combining labour market regulation and tight ¯nancial
constraint brings positive e®ects on employment.
Let us now focus on results concerning ¯nancial indicators. Our ¯ndings globally support the
idea that unemployment has ¯nancial determinants and that these determinants interact with
labour market institutions.
Regressions [1]-[2] and [7]-[8] investigate the consequences of increased market capitalization
(variable CAPI). This variable appears to promote employment: the coe±cients of CAPI is
negative and signi¯cant in speci¯cations [1] and [2]. This result is consistent with conclusions
from the theoretical literature, suggesting that ¯nancial market development has a positive
bearing on employment in terms of released ¯nancial constraints. It also con¯rms Nickell &
Wadhwani (1991)'s result that increased market capitalization has a positive impact on ¯rms'
labour demand. The result is partially con¯rmed by the analysis of the marginal e®ects of
CAPI, provided in Part A of Table 4.2. Variants [1]-[2] indicate that increased CAPI reduces
unemployment if the labour market is weakly regulated (i.e. if the degree on labour regulation
is lower than the means level) and weakly unionized (i.e. if the degree of union density is not
higher than the means level). It has no signi¯cant e®ects otherwise.
If the CAPI variable measures the size and importance of ¯nancial markets, the alternative
CREDIT indicator allows us to investigate the e®ects of intermediated credit. In columns [3]-[4]
and [7]-[8] of Table 4.1, we ¯nd no signi¯cant e®ects of CREDIT on employment. However,
looking at the sign and signi¯cance of marginal coe±cients presented in Part A of Table 4.2 (vari-
ant [4]), we ¯nd that intermediated credit reduces unemployment if the level of union density is
very high (i.e. at its maximum level). This result can be interpreted according to the theoret-
ical literature on the interactions between labour and ¯nancial markets factors: when workers
11are well-protected by unions, ¯rms are pushed to increase their productivity and monitoring
by ¯nancial intermediaries becomes pro¯table, thus making intermediated credit favourable to
employment.
Finally, we turn to the consequences of increased banking concentration (variable CONC).
As already noted, this variable has been available for a shorter period of time, so that the number
of observations is more limited. Nevertheless, the results presented in Table 4.1 (variants [5]-[6])
suggest that concentration in the banking sector has a negative direct e®ect on employment. The
interaction terms are also generally signi¯cant. Our results are better understood by looking at
the marginal e®ects presented in Table 4.2. Results provided in column [5] show that increased
CONC harms employment if the labour market is weakly regulated (i.e. when the level of labour
regulation is equal to its minimum level) while it favours employment when the labour market
is highly regulated (i.e. when the level of labour regulation is equal to its maximum level).
Moreover, banking concentration increases unemployment when union density is very low, i.e.
equal to its minimum level (column [6]). In all other cases, CONC has no signi¯cant impact. The
e®ect of banking concentration turns out to be particularly robust since the marginal coe±cients
of CONC remain signi¯cant when all ¯nancial variables and corresponding interaction terms
are included in the estimation (columns [7]-[8]). As suggested by the theoretical literature, the
rationale of these results is that two opposite mechanisms are at play. On the one hand, high
interest rates associated with low banking competition hinder employment. On the other hand,
organized workers internalize the rise in hiring costs and bargain less harshly concerning their
base wage. This moderating e®ect is stronger when unions are powerful and workers are more
protected.
Taken together, these results suggest that intermediated ¯nance (i.e. increased intermediated
credit and increased banking concentration) plays an alternative role with respect to arm's length
¯nance (i.e. increased market capitalisation and decreased banking concentration).
When labour market regulation and union density are low, an increase in arm's length ¯nance
(i.e. increased market capitalization and reduced banking concentration) yields positive e®ects
on employment. However, when labour market regulation and union density are high, the
positive impact of market capitalisation is less robust. In this case, employment can be raised
by strengthening banking concentration (if labour market regulation is tight) or by increasing
intermediated credit (if union density is high).
This provides the ¯rst evidence showing a trade-o® between intermediated ¯nance and arm's
length ¯nance in promoting employment, and that this trade-o® is mediated by the labour market
structure. Hence, our results indicate that the e®ects of ¯nancial variables on unemployment
are dependent on the labour markets context. However, it is important to note that these
interdependence are not symmetric since the impact of labour market institutions appears largely
independent of the features of ¯nancial markets.
124 Extentions
In this section, we presents two extentions to our empirical analysis. First, we check for
the robustness of empirical results by running regressions including wage coordination as an
alternative labour market device. Second, we analyse the policy implications of our empirical
evidence.
4.1 Robustness check: wage coordination
Many empirical contributions have shown that the degree of coordination in wage bargaining
is an important determinant of unemployment. Moreover, wage coordination is admittedly
one crucial factor shaping the distinction between corporatist and non-corporatist countries
(Calmsfors & Dri±ll (1988)). This section aims to check whether coordination still matters, when
considered in interaction with ¯nancial variables. Hence, we introduce the variable COORD in
all our regression speci¯cations. Results are presented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 in Appendix 4.
Table 4.3 reports regressions coe±cients for four variants of the empirical model: in columns
[1] to [3] we interact the labour market variable COORD with each ¯nancial factor in turn.
Column [4] presents the results from the comprehensive model including all ¯nancial indicators
and interaction terms. In Table 4.4, we provide marginal coe±cients' values and statistics relative
to the four speci¯cations of the empirical model. As in the previous section, we are unable to
compute sensible marginal coe±cients for COORD in variant [4], since the size of the marginal
e®ect depends on the interactions of three di®erent variables.
As in Table 4.1, the speci¯cation tests of Hansen-Sargan and Arellano & Bover (1995) respec-
tively suggest that the model is correctly speci¯ed (see bottom of Tables 4.3). From Table 4.3
one can also see that the regression results are consistent with those presented in the previous
section, concerning the control and labour market variables, in particular. Concerning the wage
coordination variable COORD, we generally observe no signi¯cant e®ects on employment. This
suggests that coordination does not contribute to wage moderation, contrary to the current view
(Calmsfors & Dri±ll (1988)). However, in variant [4], the coe±cient for COORD is positive.
This result is in the line with evidence provided by Fiori, Nicoletti, Scarpetta & Schiantarelli
(2007) and Baccaro & Rei (2007). As explained by the authors, low coordination yields low
bargaining power for workers, which may allow ¯rms to avoid an excessive rise in wages.
Turning to ¯nancial variables, our regression results show that the degree of wage coordi-
nation is not neutral with respect to the way ¯nancial determinants a®ect unemployment. In
particular, the marginal coe±cients presented in Part A of Table 4.4 suggest that, for degrees of
coordination below (or equal to) the mean level, stronger market capitalization favours a decrease
in unemployment (speci¯cation [1]). CAPI has no signi¯cant e®ect otherwise. Moreover, an
increase in banking concentration contributes to reduce unemployment for the highest degree of
coordination (speci¯cation [3]). Here again, this e®ect appears robust since marginal coe±cients
remain signi¯cant when considering all ¯nancial variables and interaction terms simultaneously
(variant [4]). Compared with ¯ndings reported in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, these results indicate that
the wage coordination variable behaves as the labour regulation indicator. This is consistent
13with the view that wage bargaining coordination works as a form of labour protection rather
than as a device ensuring real wage moderation.
More generally, the evidence presented in Tables 4.3 and Table 4.4 con¯rms our previous
¯ndings: boosting ¯nancial markets appear to e®ectively reduce unemployment, as long as the
labour market has a weakly coordinated structure. However, with highly coordinated labour
markets, increasing banking concentration becomes a more appropriate tool for reducing unem-
ployment. This supports the existence of a trade-o® between intermediated and market-based
¯nance in promoting employment, which is mediated by the labour market structure.
4.2 Policy implications
Our empirical evidence indicates that the e®ects of ¯nancial variables on unemployment
are signi¯cant and depend on the labour markets structure. Regression results suggest that
the respective virtues of bank-based and market-based ¯nance are crucially tied to the nature
and strength of labour regulation. Arm's length ¯nance (through increased capitalisation, as
well as through lesser banking concentration) is advantageous in terms of employment in the
presence of low levels of labour market regulation, union density and wage coordination. Higher
intermediated ¯nance (through increased intermediated credit and higher banking concentration)
appears to be bene¯cial for employment in the presence of high levels of labour regulation,
union density and wage coordination. These results provide evidence supporting the idea that
a correlation exists betweeen tight institutional devices on labour and ¯nancial markets (Rajan
& Zingales (1995), Egrungor (2004), Botero et al. (2005)).
In this section, we tackle the issue of the importance and size of the 'real' e®ects of ¯nance.
Based on our regression results, we present a few examples evaluating the employment conse-
quences associated with given changes in ¯nancial indicators.
Let us ¯rst consider the marginal coe±cients presented in Table 4.2. Those coe±cients
indicate that ¯nancial variables have sizeable e®ects on unemployment. Increasing market cap-
italization by 1% yields a decrease in the unemployment rate comprised between 1.56 - 1.70%,
depending on the level of labour regulation (column [1]). The impact of market capitalization
is of the same order when one considers high degrees of unionization (column [2]). Hence, lower
capitalization of ¯nancial markets can lead to substantial employment losses. As a consequence,
providing conditions for an increasing market capitalization (with respect to GDP) is one rel-
evant policy recommandation in countries with low labour regulation. Intermediated ¯nance
(CREDIT) also brings signi¯cant e®ects on unemployment: increasing credit intermediation by
one 1% reduces unemployment by 2.83% when considering highest levels of union density (col-
umn [4]). As a consequence, a decrease in intermediated credit can yield an important decline in
employment in countries with high union density. Concerning the e®ect of CONC, column [5]
indicates that increasing concentration by 1% pushes employment up by 3.07% (for the lowest
level of labour regulation) or reduces it by 6.77% (for the highest level of regulation). In this case,
strong regulation makes the e®ects of banking concentration favourable to employment while low
regulation makes it harmfull. Hence, highly regulated countries are well-advised to implement
policies that aim to increase banking concentration. Conversely, countries with relatively low
14regulation are put under greater pressure following a decrease in banking concentration. Similar
results can be obtained concerning the marginal coe±cients presented in Table 4.4. These results
suggest that ¯nancial turmoils may have signi¯cant real e®ects on employment.
We also investigate how changes in ¯nancial variables impact unemployment in each country
of our dataset. We compute simulations on the basis of the encompassing model, presented in
Table 4.1 (columns [7] and [8]) and Table 4.3 (column [4]). We select one of the three ¯nancial
variables (CAPI, CREDIT or CONC) and, for each year, we set it equal to its 'high level',
de¯ned as its observed level plus one standard deviation. The labour variable and the two other
¯nancial variables are kept equal to their observed value. Using our econometric estimates of the
encompassing model, we compute the rate of unemployment compatible with the 'high level' of
the selected ¯nancial variable. We then compare the value of the estimated unemployment rate
with the observed unemployment rate.
Figures 1 and 2, in Appendix 5, are two interesting examples of simulations. In Figure
1, the selected ¯nancial variable (set equal to its 'high level') is CONC and the interaction
labour variable is UNION while in Figure 2, the selected ¯nancial variable is CONC and
the interaction labour variable is COORD10. In Figure 1, the predicted unemployment rate is
higher than the observed unemployment rate for many coutries in which the degree of union
density is particularly low (the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France,
Germany, Canada). Conversely, the estimated unemployment rate is lower than the observed
unemployment rate in countries with high union density such as Denmark, Norway, Sweden and
Portugal for example. This suggests that in countries where the degree of union density is high,
employment performance would have been improved with less competition in the banking sector.
In Figure 2, a high level of banking concentration reduces the unemployment rate compared to
its observed level in Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain notably
while raising it in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. This supports the
view that reducing competition in the banking sector is a relevant policy when the degree of
coordination is high whereas it worsens employment when wage bargaining is weakly coordinated.
5 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to examine how ¯nancial market arrangements interact with
labour regulation to determine unemployment by estimating a dynamic panel data model using
GMM techniques over the period 1980-2004. Indeed, such techniques provide solutions to the
problems of simultaneity bias, reverse causality and omitted variables, and also allow to control
for individual speci¯c e®ects and time e®ects, as well as to overcome the endogeneity bias. Our
econometric estimates show that the development of arms' length ¯nance (through increased
capitalization and lower banking concentration) favours employment in the presence of low lev-
els of labour market regulation, union density and wage bargaining coordination. At the same
time, improved intermediated ¯nance (through increased intermediated credit and higher bank-
10As the variable CONC is missing for almost all years in the case of Finland, Figure 1 and Figure 2 do not
provide simulations for this country.
15ing concentration) is bene¯cial for employment in the presence of high levels of labour market
regulation, union density and wage coordination.
Our ¯ndings suggest that ¯nancial variables impact unemployment in a way that crucially
depends on the labour market context. In the presence of weakly regulated, unionized and coor-
dinated labour markets, policies boosting market-based ¯nance prove to be e®ective in enhancing
employment. However, with strong labour regulation, union density and coordination in wage
bargaining, reducing competition in the banking sector and promoting intermediated credit has
positive consequences on employment. These estimated e®ects of ¯nance appear to be signi¯cant
and sizeable.
Our paper also advocates care in analyzing the e®ectiveness of changes on ¯nancial and labour
markets. The e®ects of deregulation policies are not linear. For instance, while tightening labour
protection decreases unemployment (for low levels of market capitalization), it also leads to a
new context in which market-based ¯nance has no more e®ect on employment.
To conclude, we ¯nd no evidence corroborating the existence of a simple complementarity (or
substitution) across ¯nancial and labour market structures. In fact, our results suggest that a
more complex interdependence exists across ¯nancial and labour determinants of unemployment.
This calls for further investigations and opens up a rich research agenda.
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21Table 1.2: Statistical summary for variables (1980-2004)
Variables Mean Max Min
U 7.447 19.5 1.5
(3.504)
LMREG 1.140 0.558 0.1
(0.558)
UNION 41.996 87.4 7.4
(21.068)
COORD 2.051 3 1
(0.578)
CAPI 0.492 2.7 0.003
(0.404)
CREDIT 0.878 2.168 0.220
(0.378)
CONC 0.678 1 0.226
(0.203)
WEDGE 28.693 46.962 12.944
(8.081)
REPLACE 0.356 28 0
(1.312)
PMREG 4.033 6 1.108
(1.285)
EXCHANGE 0.002 0.266 -0.203
(0.058)
RATE 5.187 -2.215 17.347
(3.642)
GDP 53 912.02 80 659.9 26 558.71
(9 983.803)

















Standard deviations are in parentheses.
22APPENDIX 2: Estimation of a Dynamic Panel Data Model using the Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM)
We use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator for dynamic panels intro-
duced by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), and Arellano and
Bover (1995) in order to investigate how labour and ¯nancial factors interact to determine un-
employment. We consider the following equation:
yi;t = yi;t¡1 + ¯Xi;t + ui + ºt + ei;t (3)
where yi;t denotes the standardized rate of unemployment obtained from the OECD, Xi;t includes
a number of regressors capturing the institutional and macroeconomic characteristics of the
investigated economies (see section 3.1), ui is the individual speci¯c e®ect, ºt the time speci¯c
e®ect, and ei;t the error term (i is individual index, and t is the time index).
The presence of the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable does not allow
the use of standard econometric techniques. The GMM method for dynamic panels provides
solutions to the problems of simultaneity bias, reverse causality and omitted variables. Besides,
it allows one to control for individual speci¯c e®ects ui, and time e®ects ºt as well as to overcome
the endogeneity bias.
There are two types of GMM estimators for dynamic panels: (i) the ¯rst-di®erenced GMM
estimator (Arellano & Bond (1991)); and (ii) the system GMM estimator (Blundel & Bond
(1998)). The former eliminates speci¯c individual e®ects through ¯rst-di®erencing of a single
equation, and then instruments the explanatory variables using their lagged values in levels. The
latter involves the estimation of a system containing both ¯rst{di®erenced and levels equations,
where the variables are instrumented by their ¯rst di®erences.
The choice of lagged variables as instruments depends on the nature of the explanatory
variables:
1. For the exogenous variables, their current values are used as instruments;
2. For variables which are either predetermined or in°uenced by previous values of the
dependent variable, but not correlated with future values of the error term, lagged values for at
least one period can be used as instruments;
3. For endogenous variables, only their lagged values for at least two periods can be used as
valid instruments.
The use of these estimators is based on the assumption of quasi-stationary variables in the
equation in levels, and no autocorrelation of the residuals. To deal with potential omitted
variables bias arising from speci¯c e®ects, the strategy of Arellano-Bond estimator (1991) is to
take ¯rst di®erences. This implies the following speci¯cation:
yi;t ¡ yi;t¡1 = ®(yi;t¡1 ¡ yi;t¡2) + ¯(Xi;t ¡ Xi;t¡1) + (ºi;t ¡ ºi;t¡1) + (ei;t ¡ ei;t¡1) (4)
By construction, the error term (ei;t ¡ei;t¡1) is correlated with the lagged variable in di®erences
(yi;t¡1 ¡ yi;t¡2). The ¯rst di®erences of the explanatory variables of the model are instrumented
through their lagged values (in levels) in order to reduce the simultaneity bias and the bias
resulting from the presence of the lagged dependent variable in di®erences on the left-hand side.
23Under the assumption that the error terms are not autocorrelated and that the explanatory
variables of the model may be in°uenced by lagged values, but are uncorrelated with future
values of the error term, the following moment conditions have to be satis¯ed for the equation
in ¯rst di®erences:
Ejyt¡s;(ei;t ¡ ei;t¡1)j = 0 for s ¸ 2;t = 3;:::T (5)
EjXt¡s;(ei;t ¡ ei;t¡1)j = 0 for s ¸ 2;t = 3;:::T (6)
However, this estimator su®ers from the `weakness' of its instruments, which entails considerable
bias, especially for small size samples, and therefore its accuracy is asymptotically low. Specif-
ically, the lagged values of the explanatory variables are `weak' instruments for the equation in
¯rst di®erences: the GMM estimator for the ¯rst di®erence takes into account only the intra-
individuals variations, the inter-individuals variations being removed through the di®erencing.
The GMM system estimator (that we use in our analysis) eliminates this problem by com-
bining the equation in di®erence with an equation in levels, i.e. it estimates equation (4) (in
¯rst di®erences) simultaneously with equation (2) (in levels). In equation (1), the variables are
instrumented using their most recent lags in ¯rst di®erences. Blundell and Bond (1998) tested
this method using Monte Carlo simulations and found that (i) the GMM system estimator is
more e±cient than the GMM in di®erences; and (ii) the GMM in ¯rst di®erences produces bi-
ased coe±cients for small samples when the instruments are `weak'. For the equation in levels,
the GMM system method uses additional moment conditions assuming that the explanatory
variables are stationary:
Ej(yt+s ¡ yt+s¡1):(ui + ei;t)j = 0 for s = 1;t = 3;:::T (7)
Ej(Xt+s ¡ Xt+s¡1):(ui + ei;t)j = 0 for s = 1;t = 3;:::T (8)
Conditions (5) to (8) combined with the GMM method allow one to estimate the coe±cients of
model.
The consistency of the GMM Estimator depends on whether lagged values of the explanatory
variables are valid instruments in the regression. We address this issue by considering two
speci¯cation tests suggested by Arellano & Bond (1991) and Arellano & Bover (1995). The ¯rst
test examines the null hypothesis that the error term ei;t is not serially correlated. The model
speci¯cation is supported when the null hypothesis is not rejected. In the system speci¯cation,
we test whether the di®erenced error term (that is, the residual of the regression in di®erences)
exhibits second-order serial correlation. First-order serial correlation of the di®erenced error term
is expected even if the original error term (in levels) is uncorrelated, unless the latter follows
a random walk. Second-order serial correlation of the di®erenced residual indicates that the
original error term is serially correlated and follows a moving average process at least of order
one. This would imply that the proposed instruments are not valid (and that higher-order lags
should be used as instruments). The second tests is the Hansen-Sargan test of over-identifying
restrictions. It tests the overall validity of the instruments by analysing the sample analogue of
the moment conditions used in the estimation process. Failure to reject the null hypothesis gives
support to the model.
24APPENDIX 3: Panel unit root test results
Table 3.1: Summary of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) panel unit root test and Hadri (2000) panel
stationarity test for the standardized rate of unemployment (U)
Method Statistic P-value* Cross sections
Null: Unit root for all panel members
Pesaran and Shin W-stat -5.49643 0.0000 18
Null: no unit root in any of the series in the panel
Hadri Z-stat -0.13842 0.5550 18
* The tests assume asymptotic normality. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth
selection using a Bartlett kernel
Table 3.2: Summary of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) panel unit root test and Hadri (2000) panel
stationarity test for the degree of union density (UNION)
Method Statistic P-value* Cross sections
Null: Unit root for all panel members
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -8.54382 0.0000 18
Null: no unit root in any of the series in the panel
Hadri Z-stat-0.64937 0.7419 18
* The tests assume asymptotic normality. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth
selection using a Bartlett kernel
Table 3.3: Summary of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) panel unit root test and Hadri (2000) panel
stationarity test for the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (CAPI)
Method Statistic P-value* Cross sections
Null: Unit root for all panel members
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -4.11984 0.0000 18
Null: no unit root in any of the series in the panel
Hadri Z-stat -1.53963 0.9382 18
* The tests assume asymptotic normality. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth
selection using a Bartlett kernel
25Table 3.4: Summary of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) panel unit root test and Hadri (2000)
panel stationarity test for the ratio of the claims to the private sector by ¯nancial intermediaries
(CREDIT)
Method Statistic P-value* Cross sections
Null: Unit root for all panel members
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -10.4463 0.0000 18
Null: no unit root in any of the series in the panel
Hadri Z-stat 0.84178 0.2000 18
* The tests assume asymptotic normality. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth
selection using a Bartlett kernel
Table 3.5: Summary of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) panel unit root test and Hadri (2000) panel
stationarity test for the ratio of the three largest banks' asset to total banking sector assets
(CONC)
Method Statistic P-value* Cross sections
Null: Unit root for all panel members
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -5.28200 0.0000 18
Null: no unit root in any of the series in the panel
Hadri Z-stat 0.20449 0.4190 18
* The tests assume asymptotic normality. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth
selection using a Bartlett kernel
Table 3.6: Summary of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) panel unit root test and Hadri (2000) panel
stationarity test for the ratio of the tax wedge (WEDGE)
Method Statistic P-value* Cross sections
Null: Unit root for all panel members
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -6.22609 0.0000 18
Null: no unit root in any of the series in the panel
Hadri Z-stat -0.45862 0.6767 18
* The tests assume asymptotic normality. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth
selection using a Bartlett kernel
Table 3.7: Summary of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) panel unit root test and Hadri (2000) panel
stationarity test for the short-term interest rate (RATE)
Method Statistic P-value* Cross sections
Null: Unit root for all panel members
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -16.1445 0.0000 18
Null: no unit root in any of the series in the panel
Hadri Z-stat -1.30699 0.9044 18
* The tests assume asymptotic normality. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth
selection using a Bartlett kernel
26Table 3.8: Summary of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) panel unit root test and Hadri (2000) panel
stationarity test for the real exchange rate (EXCHANGE)
Method Statistic P-value* Cross sections
Null: Unit root for all panel members
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -8.94055 0.0000 18
Null: no unit root in any of the series in the panel
Hadri Z-stat -0.64937 0.7419 18
* The tests assume asymptotic normality. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth
selection using a Bartlett kernel
Table 3.9: Summary of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) panel unit root test and Hadri (2000) panel
stationarity test for the GDP per employee (GDP)
Method Statistic P-value* Cross sections
Null: Unit root for all panel members
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -8.58617 0.0000 18
Null: no unit root in any of the series in the panel
Hadri Z-stat 0.41516 0.3390 18
* The tests assume asymptotic normality. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth
selection using a Bartlett kernel
Table 3.10: Summary of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) panel unit root test and Hadri (2000)
panel stationarity test for the ratio of the °ow of credit in the economy to GDP (CY CLE)
Method Statistic P-value* Cross sections
Null: Unit root for all panel members
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -4.10866 0.0000 18
Null: no unit root in any of the series in the panel
Hadri Z-stat -0.74265 0.7712 18
* The tests assume asymptotic normality. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West bandwidth
selection using a Bartlett kernel
27APPENDIX 4: Estimation results
Table 4.1: Econometric results with LMREG or UNION in interaction terms
Speci¯cations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ui;t¡1 0.627*** 0.626*** 0.655*** 0.664*** 0.558*** 0.719*** 0.556*** 0.656***
(0.070) (0.709) (0.092) (0.101) (0.093) (0.098) (0.152) (0.115)
LMREG -3.649* -3.572** -1.452 -3.691 3.033 -1.449 6.297 -0.620
(2.046) (2.229) (1.602) (2.729) (2.130) (2.227) (8.851) (1.214)
UNION -0.004 0.012 -0.053 0.070 -0.009 0.126 0.048 0.057
(0.041) (0.026) (0.040) (0.057) (0.064) (0.096) (0.234) (0.072)
CAPI -1.542* -2.016* 3.190 1.051
(0.767) (0.997) (4.287) (1.811)
CREDIT 0.329 2.680 0.863 -0.616
(1.676) (2.703) (9.958) (2.445)
CONC 3.611* 5.150** 4.199 3.744**











CONC:UNION -0.136 * -7.424 **
(0.064) (2.667)
WEDGE 0.100 0.078 0.228* 0.059 0.078 0 .252** 0.405** 0.161
(0.089) (0.092) (0.131) (0.176) (0.105) (0.105) (0.194) (0.101)
REPLACE 3.401 3.025 6.539 -3.489 -3.133 -4.910 0.627 -7.668
(6.809) (4.493) (5.564) (9.186) (5.376) (7.346) (8.945) (12.039)
PMREG 0.663 0.848 0.573 1.518** 1.463* 0.992* 0.093 0.538
(0.608) (0.624) (0.812) (0.627) (0.717) (0.561) (0.713) (0.781)
EXCHANGE -4.291** -3.577** -2.585 -4.268*** -0.352 -0.986 -2.929 -3.831**
(1.571) (1.471) (1.699) (1.467) (0.980) (1.166) (2.026) (1.381)
RATE 0.111 0.116 0.092 0.156** 0.053 0.072 0.107 0.135
(0.084) (0.086) (0.138) (0.072) (0.076) (0.101) (0.263) (0.084)
GDP 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CY CLE -0.058** -0.043*** -0.042 -0.072** -0.060* -0.088** -0.057 -0.070***
(0.021) (0.019) (0.024) (0.025) (0.029) (0.031) (0.040) (0.020)
Number of observations 314 314 310 310 162 162 152 152
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
P-value Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) 0.003 0.047 0.014 0.006 0.082 0.071 0.043 0.094
P-value Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 0.182 0.101 0.115 0.131 0.149 0.150 0.552 0.159
P-value Hansen-Sargan test 0.196 0.229 0.556 0.303 0.188 0.162 0.321 0.109
1. Two-step GMM Robust standard errors for ¯nite sample computed using the correction de¯ned by Windmeijer
(2005) are in bracket.
2. *, ** and *** denote signi¯cance respectively at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
3. The null of the Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) is the absence of residual autocorrelation of order 1 (see
Appendix 2.).
4. The null of the Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) is the absence of residual autocorrelation of order 2 (see
Appendix 2.).
5. The null of the Hansen-Sargan test is the validity of instruments (see Appendix 2).
28Table 4.2: Econometric results with LMREG or UNION in interaction terms:
marginal e®ects of ¯nancial and labour market variables
Speci¯cations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Part A Marginal e®ects of CAPI
interacted with interacted with interacted with interacted with
LMREG UNION LMREG UNION LMREG UNION LMREG UNION
LABOURmin -1.567** -1.998** 3.012 0.839
(0.701) (0.862) (3.944) (1.290)
LABOURmean¡se -1.693** -1.968** 2.230 0.666
(0.723) (0.705) (2.514) (0.936)
LABOURmean -1.836 -1.915** 1.237 0.250
(1.265) (0.767) (1.420) (0.948)
LABOURmean+se -1.979 -1.862 0.243 -0.165
(1.947) (1.155) (2.454) (1.908)
LABOURmax -2.057 -1.802 -0.254 -0.801
(2.335) (1.732) (3.341) (3.618)
Marginal e®ects of CREDIT
interacted with interacted with interacted with interacted with
LMREG UNION LMREG UNION LMREG UNION LMREG UNION
LABOURmin 0.315 2.213 0.806 -0.603
(1.519) (2.431) (9.009) (2.147)
LABOURmean¡se 0.252 1.378 0.556 -0.593
(0.876) (1.966) (4.883) (1.914)
LABOURmean 0.171 0.019 0.239 -0.568
(0.691) (1.332) (1.503) (1.416)
LABOURmean+se 0.090 -1.339 -0.077 -0.544
(1.441) (1.102) (6.161) (1.090)
LABOURmax 0.041 -2.830* -0.236 -0.506
(1.983) (1.537) (8.803) (1.272)
Marginal e®ects of CONC
interacted with interacted with interacted with interacted with
LMREG UNION LMREG UNION LMREG UNION LMREG UNION
LABOURmin 3.074* 3.827* 3.457 2.983*
(1.741) (1.924) (2.311) (1.464)
LABOURmean¡se 0.664 2.723 0.193 2.364*
(1.679) (1.757) (2.174) (1.250)
LABOURmean -2.292 0.162 -3.949 0.873
(2.131) (1.937) 2.812 (1.053)
LABOURmean+se -5.249 -2.397 -8.092 * -0.616
(3.311) (2.706) 3.940 (1.413)
LABOURmax -6.774* -6.390 -10.172** -2.895
(3.880) (4.325) (4.584) (2.438)
Part B Marginal e®ects of LMREG
interacted with CAPI interacted with CREDIT interacted with CONC
FINmin -3.650* -1.484 1.817
(2.046) (1.718) (1.802)
FINmean¡se -3.670* -1.517 0.387
(2.047) (1.668) (1.548)
FINmean -3.757* -1.570 -0.675
(2.113) (1.779) (1.494)
FINmean+se -3.843 -1.624 -1.738
(2.268) (2.090) (1.769)
FINmax -4.135 -1.750 -2.331
(3.232) (3.237) (1.663)
Marginal e®ects of UNION
interacted with CAPI interacted with CREDIT interacted with CONC
FINmin 0.012 0.055 0.095
(0.040) (0.051) (0.091)
FINmean¡se 0.012 0.041 0.059
(0.040) (0.046) (0.088)
FINmean 0.012 0.017 0.032
(0.039) (0.042) (0.088)
FINmean+se 0.014 -0.006 0.005
(0.041) (0.043) (0.08)
FINmax 0.017 -0.062 -0.009
(0.058) (0.063) (0.091)
Standard errors are in parentheses.
*, ** and *** denote signi¯cance respectively at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
29Table 4.3: Econometric results with COORD in interaction terms
Speci¯cations (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ui;t¡1 0.641*** 0.641*** 0.744*** 0.647***
(0.076) (0.1119) (0.132) (0.131)
LMREG -3.982* -2.494 0.360 0.647
(2.288) (2.299) (3.161) (1.210)
COORD -0.192 0.076 4.686* 4.784
(1.258) (1.718) (2.680) (2.983)
UNION 0.016 -0.035 0.028 -0.008













WEDGE 0.057 0.213 0.181 0.141
(0.113) (0.148) (0.163) (0.104)
REPLACE 2.670 6.971 -2.158 -3.501
(5.803) (10.131) (5.971) (11.328)
PMREG 0.962 0.854 1.653** 0.045
(0.860) (0.827) (5.735) (0.569)
EXCHANGE -3.926** -1.511 1.074 -2.605
(1.684) (2.058) (1.978) (1.787)
RATE 0.092 0.071 0.104 0.000
(0.078) (0.157) (0.084) (0.151)
GDP 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CY CLE -0.071 ** -0.028 -0.070*** -0.063**
(0.017) (0.027) (0.022) (0.027)
Number of observations 313 310 162 152
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
P-value Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) 0.006 0.070 0.095 0.097
P-value Arellano-Bond test for R(2) 0.180 0.160 0.229 0.415
P-value Hansen-Sargan test 0.126 0.610 0.126 0.303
1. Two-step GMM Robust standard errors for ¯nite sample computed using the correction de¯ned by Windmeijer
(2005) are in bracket.
2. *, ** and *** denote signi¯cance respectively at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
3. The null of the Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) is the absence of residual autocorrelation of order 1 (see
Appendix 2).
4. The null of the Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) is the absence of residual autocorrelation of order 2 (see
Appendix 2).
5. The null of the Hansen-Sargan test is the validity of instruments (see Appendix 2).
30Table 4.4: Econometric results with COORD in interaction terms:
marginal e®ects of ¯nancial and labour market variables
Speci¯cations (1) (2) (3) (4)
Part A Marginal e®ects of CAPI
Interacted with Interacted with Interacted with Interacted with











Marginal e®ects of CREDIT
Interacted with Interacted with Interacted with Interacted with











Marginal e®ects of CONC
Interacted with Interacted with Interacted with Interacted with











Part B Marginal e®ects of COORD
Interacted with Interacted with Interacted with
CAPI CREDIT CONC
FINmin -0.192 -0.226 3.580
(1.257) (1.441) (2.215)
FINmean¡se -0.206 -0.533 2.280
(1.235) (1.338) (1.711)
FINmean -0.266 -1.031 1.314
(1.209) (1.618) (1.393)
FINmean+se -0.325 -1.530 0.347
(1.292) (2.246) (1.170)
FINmax -0.526 -2.708 -0.191
(2.094) (4.139) (1.110)
*, ** and *** denote signi¯cance respectively at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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